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ABSTRACT
CONSTRAINTS OF HUMAN NATURE IN
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF ROUSSEAU
Timothy Joseph Clishem, M.A.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Andrea Radasanu, Director

In his Second Discourse and elsewhere, Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously argues for the
perfectibility and malleability of man. That is, for Rousseau, man is the “historical” being whose
moral character, dispositions, and inclinations are variable and to a large extent underdetermined by his nature. This thesis argues, however, that Rousseau also believes man’s moral
character to be in various ways constrained by his nature. These “constraints of human nature”
flow from the basic nature of the human person as asocial and activated solely by self-love.
They characterize all human conditions and human types and permanently limit man in terms of
his social, moral capacities, and his ability to practice moral virtue. In the first half of the thesis,
I discuss the constraints and provide textual evidence for them from the Second Discourse,
Emile, and the political writings. In the second, I show how Rousseau’s social contract theory
and its centerpiece—the sovereignty of the general will—presuppose the constraints of nature.
This analysis demonstrates the morally realistic character of Rousseau’s seemingly idealistic
political thought and clarifies both the place of natural rights in the legitimate state and the
notion of the moral infallibility of the legitimate sovereign. Last, I address an objection to the
essay’s essential thesis that natural human asociality constitutes a permanent constraint—
namely, civil man’s acquisition of sociability in the forms of moral freedom and civic virtue.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Among Rousseau’s famous and influential ideas is the notion that human nature does not
constrain us such as to render fixed, constant, and unalterable human character. Due to
that unique faculty of perfectibility, which distinguishes man from the beasts, it is determined
for Rousseau, rather, by history: “the successive conditions that decisively shape what the
individual comes to be with his fellows.”1 This faculty renders human nature unstable, and it
permits our degradation, corruption, and alienation from our natural goodness. It does, however,
have a flipside, for, while normally the unconscious historical process Rousseau describes in
the Second Discourse corrupts human character and destroys natural goodness, the intervention
of wisdom can control the “successive conditions” and shape civilized men into the artificial
models of goodness described in the “constructive writings” (the man of the Emile and the
citizen of the political writings). For this reason, Rousseau’s reflections on the human situation
do not leave civilized man without hope, for though the state in which we lived our natural life
has been irretrievably lost, it does not, and need not, be used as a standard for our improvement.
Indeed, our departure from the state of nature and arrival onto the plane of history, along with
our radical corrigibility, force us to “invent an altogether new life and happiness”2 through our
own will, wisdom, and courage, apart from natural or divine standards.
1

Scott, “The Theodicy of the Second Discourse: The ‘Pure State of Nature’ and Rousseau’s
Political Thought,” 697.
2

Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought, 89.

2

Yet while Rousseau frequently insists on the principle of human malleability, or openendedness, as well as its philosophical consequences (e.g., that human wickedness cannot be
imputed to man’s inherent nature), explicit textual evidence suggests he also gives due weight to
the competing notion that man’s character is constrained by his nature. In the Second Discourse,
for example, Rousseau calls perfectibility an “almost unlimited faculty” (72, emphasis added).3
Commentator Roger Masters, in The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, argues that the use here
of the word “almost” raises the question as to “just what persisting natural characteristics
Rousseau thought could limit man’s… perfectibility?”4 One such limitation Rousseau makes
explicit includes the permanency of the sentiments, natural passions, and the conscience rooted
in natural sensibility (SW, 164). Thus, in the Political Economy he presents this objection to the
political scheme he promotes:
I may be told that anyone who has to govern men should not look for a perfection
beyond their nature of which they are not capable; that he must not seek to
destroy their passions, and that carrying out such a project would be no more
desirable than it would be possible. (20)
But in the Emile, he actually endorses the view manifested in this objection:
Our passions are the principle instruments of our preservation. It is, therefore, an
enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them – it is to control
nature, it is to reform the work of God… I would find someone who wanted to
prevent the birth of the passions almost as mad as someone who wanted to
annihilate them; and those who believed that this was my project up to now would
surely have understood me very badly. (212)

3

Rousseau references are cited in text and abbreviated (to SD for the Second Discourse, E for
the Emile, SC for the Social Contract, Geneva for the Geneva Manuscript, PE for the Political
Economy, SW for The State of War, and Poland for the Government of Poland). Editions include
Bloom’s (1979) translation for the Emile, Scott’s (2012) translation for the Second Discourse,
and Gourevitch’s (1997) translation for all other Rousseau works.
4

Masters, Political Philosophy, 296.
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He endorses these points because “a man devoid of all passions would certainly be a very bad
citizen” (PE 20). For Rousseau, then, political institutions cannot and should not destroy natural
sentiments to the extent that citizens love nothing at all. Therefore, for example, the formation
of genuine citizens does not altogether exclude their experiencing natural sentiments as they
express themselves in pre-political, natural relationships such as the family.5
This example, along with additional textual evidence, suggests that though historical
forces, such as the educative impact of social, political institutions, can modify nature in certain
respects and to a limited degree, they cannot altogether destroy it. In The State of War, Rousseau
says that with the formation of the first societies, though “everywhere nature has disappeared;
[and] everywhere human art has taken its place,” “it is vain to think that nature can be
annihilated, it arises anew and appears where it was least expected” (167-168). He reiterates this
point at the beginning of the Emile:
Are there not habits contracted only by force which never do stifle nature? Such,
for example, is the habit of the plants whose vertical direction is interfered with.
The plant, set free, keeps the inclination it was forced to take. But the sap has not
as a result changed its original direction; and if the plant continues to grow, its
new growth resumes the vertical direction. The same is the case for men’s
inclinations. So long as one remains in the same condition, the inclinations which
result from habit and are the least natural to us can be kept; but as soon as the
situation changes, habit ceases and the natural returns. (39)
Thus, for Rousseau, though artificial institutions can temporarily restrain, stifle, or oppose
nature, they cannot entirely remake it. Despite all our best efforts, “invincible nature” will

5

Indeed, in opposition to Plato’s project – destroying private families and establishing equality
of the sexes – Rousseau believes that good laws should only attempt to redirect citizens’
sentiments of love originating in the family to their fellow citizens (E, 362-363). See also
Masters, Political Philosophy, 22-25, and Strauss, Natural Right and History, 289.
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eventually regain “its empire” (SC, 80).6
In light of this preliminary evidence, therefore, the interpreter of Rousseau must take care
to balance the idealistic strand of Rousseau’s thought rooted in the corrigibility of our character
with another, realistic, strand that emphasizes its limits. This essay contends that the latter,
though under emphasized in Rousseau’s thought, amounts to a set of specific, consequential,
“constraints of human nature.”7 For Rousseau, these constraints constitute fixed and residual
psychological facets that persist throughout man’s historical development and characterize his
conceptions of “good” human types (e.g., natural man and citizen) no less than bad ones (i.e., the
bourgeois). Residing in the theoretical core of his view of essential human nature, they bound
the possible in morals and politics and impose limitations on human malleability, and it is only
within these bounds that the social- and psychological-engineering projects Rousseau describes
in the Emile and the political works can be undertaken.
6

As Plattner says: “For no matter how potent the art of legislation may be, Rousseau
understood that it could never succeed in transforming a physical being into a moral being – that
is, in completely denaturing man” (Rousseau’s State of Nature: An Interpretation of the
Discourse on Inequality, 119). Melzer, speaking of Rousseau’s political schemes, concurs in this
point: “Such total psychological transformation is not possible… because nature cannot be
wholly overcome” (Natural Goodness, 96).
7

For the notion of “constraints of nature” I am indebted to Roger Masters. See Masters,
Political Philosophy, 293-300. Masters points to two natural constraints on politics. First, for
Rousseau the nature of man implies that “the legitimacy of civil society is constrained by the
necessity that political institutions conform to… the logic of obedience elaborated in Rousseau’s
‘principles of political right’” (“Rousseau and the Rediscovery of Human Nature,” 125).
Second, in Rousseau’s Montesquieu-influenced politics, the successful founding and good
legislation must take their bearings by the local circumstances – such as climate and geography,
morals, manners, and way of thinking, as well as the degree of progress, enlightenment, and
corruption – of a given people. Relatedly, the pessimistic view of history outlined in the Second
Discourse amounts to a constraint on politics in that the practical art of legislation entails
compromising the principles of legitimacy in their purity. For these points see Political
Philosophy, 250, 369, 373-380, 410-413; “Rediscovery of Human Nature,” 125-126.

5

Building on the work of scholars within the interpretive tradition of Leo Strauss,8 in this
thesis I give an account of the constraints of nature and some of their consequences in
Rousseau’s political thought. In the first half, I discuss the modern, realistic view of essential
human nature they are rooted in and present the constraints themselves, turning for evidence to
the Second Discourse, Emile, and certain passages in the political writings. In the second, I
interpret the political theory of the Social Contract in terms of the constraints of nature and in
this way demonstrate the realistic character of and shed new light on interpretive problems in
the political thought of Rousseau.

8

For an excellent summary of this interpretive tradition see Marks, “The Savage Pattern: The
Unity of Rousseau’s Thought Revisited,” 76-78.

CHAPTER 2
ROUSSEAU’S VISION OF HUMAN NATURE

In the preface to the Second Discourse, Rousseau critiques existing doctrines of natural
right on the basis that natural right cannot be known if man’s nature is unknown, and past
political philosophers had failed to know human nature (53-54). But Rousseau complicates the
quest to know human nature by discovering the truth that man is the historical being, that his
authentic nature is buried beneath layers of acquired faculties, passions, moral qualities,
knowledge and errors, and social prejudices (SD, 51-52). The impact of history so radically
molds human character as to constitute a nearly insurmountable obstacle to knowledge of our
nature. As Rousseau asks in the preface to the Second Discourse:
And how will man ever manage to see himself as nature formed him, through all
the changes that the sequence of time and of things must have produced in his
original constitution, and to disentangle what he retains of his own stock from
what circumstances and his progress have added to or changed in his primitive
state? (51)
This observation grounds his critique of his predecessors’ conceptions of human nature. It
shows that the method by which Hobbes identified the natural passions and inferred the natural
state of war – introspection and self-reflection – cannot disclose the true nature of man. For
one’s own qualities may have been imparted not by nature, but by the barely perceptible
historical impact of an already corrupt civil society. It also shows that no naïve observation of
other men as they are now in our immediate situation can ever disclose man’s true nature; for our
immediate situation is historical. And as Rousseau famously says, “The human race of one age

7

is not the human race of another age” (SD, 115). In sum, due to their want of what Arthur
Melzer calls an “historical sense,”1 Rousseau’s philosophic predecessors, “speaking of need,
greed, oppression, desires, and pride, have carried into the state of nature ideas they have taken
from society: they spoke of savage man and they were depicting civil man” (SD, 62).
By following modern theoretical premises more radically and consistently than his
predecessors, Rousseau avoids their errors and discovers the true state of nature. He ruthlessly
abandons all teleological presuppositions about human nature by locating it at “man’s
beginnings, not his end or perfection.”2 Thus throughout his writings Rousseau recognizes
elemental self-preservation as the sole natural duty and goal toward which our natural faculties
and passions are directed. In the Emile he says, “Our first duties are to ourselves; our primary
sentiments are centered on ourselves; all our natural movements relate in the first instance to our
preservation and our well-being” (97). It follows that men are by nature free and independent:
This common freedom is a consequence of man’s nature. His first law is to attend
to his own preservation, his first cares are those he owes himself, and since, as
soon as he has reached the age of reason, he is sole judge of the means proper to
preserve himself, he becomes his own master. (SC, 42)
Furthermore, though Hobbes, armed with similar premises, argues that man’s natural
independence and desire for preservation do ultimately drive him into civil society due to the
selfish passions that produce the state of war, Rousseau argues that the goal of self-preservation
does not involve individuals in any sort of stable social relations (whether of conflict or
cooperation). Thus he radicalizes the premise of the natural asociality of man, claiming that it
shows not merely that he is naturally selfish, but that by nature he is self-sufficient and lives a

1

Natural Goodness, 46, 50.

2

Masters, Political Philosophy, 5.
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virtually solitary life (SD, 88-89).3
Rousseau’s reflections on the state of nature suggest the specific vision of the nature of
the human person he articulates in the Second Discourse and the Emile. In it he considers man to
be a simple being activated by the principle of self-love, but who lacks an independent,
irreducible principle of natural sociability. In the preface to the Second Discourse he says:
Setting aside, therefore, all the scientific books that teach us only to see men as
they have made themselves, and meditating on the first and simplest operations of
the human soul, I believe I perceive in it two principles preceding reason, one of
which interests us ardently in our well-being and our self-preservation, and the
other of which inspires in us a natural repugnance to see any sensitive being, and
principally our fellow humans, perish or suffer. (54)
The presence of self-love and pity as attributes of the soul by nature and the absence of
sociability follow from Rousseau’s opinion that the self-sufficient and solitary pursuit of narrow
bodily goods constitutes the sole preoccupation of natural man and that self-preservation forms
the sole goal of human life. For example, he reasons toward the beginning of Emile Book 4
that, if the primary duty of man is to undertake the actions necessary for his preservation, he
must be inclined to do so. Primordial self-love, or amour de soi, provides man with this
inclination (E 213; SD 147). Further, that preservation does not naturally require the help of nor
in any way involve him with others implies the absence of sociability. Rousseau comments in
the Second Discourse, in the context of his discussion of the problem of the origin of language,
for example, “how little care nature has taken to bring men together through mutual needs,” and
“how little it has prepared their sociability and how little it has contributed… to all they have

3

Summing up the result of his observations of “physical man,” he says that, in the state of
nature “it is impossible to imagine why… a man would need another man any more than a
monkey or a wolf would need its fellow creature, nor assuming this need, what motive could
induce the other to provide for it; nor even, if he did how they could agree with one another on
the terms” (SD, 80). Such is the extent of man’s natural asociality according to Rousseau.
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done to establish social bonds” (80).
The conception of the natural human self that results from these principles is welldescribed by Arthur Melzer: “According to Rousseau, the fundamental principle of human
nature is self-love: the innate inclination to delight in, preserve, and actualize ourselves.”4 “The
crucial issue is, What is the human self that we incline to delight in, preserve, and actualize?”5
Rousseau considers the object of natural self-love to be the non-contingent, or self-subsistent,
“atomic” individual, rather than the political animal of Aristotle who exists through a relation
to the political community or the Christian who exists through a relation to God.6 For
Melzer, “Rousseau maintains that the true foundation of the human self is not God or reason or
the community but the elemental self-consciousness of the individual.”7 Thus it is the sentiment
of existence, the primordial self-awareness of the individual that, for Rousseau, represents the
hard core of the natural self.8 He thinks, therefore, that the natural self is, in a radical sense,
absolute, devoid of qualities that imply connections to others. As he announces in the Emile:
“Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole which is relative
only to itself or its kind” (39). Far from claiming that nature orients the human self toward
political community and obligation, Rousseau thinks, then, that aside from pity and the sexual
inclination, our essential nature can be exhaustively described without at all referring to social or
4

Melzer, “Rousseau and the Modern Cult of Sincerity,” 287.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid; for these points, see also Melzer, Natural Goodness, 38-40.
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political relations, or moral qualities.9
This radical asociality and selfishness represent the primary and most fundamental
constraint in Rousseau’s philosophy of the natural human self. That is, Rousseau thinks that, no
matter in what direction or to what extent, man’s history alters his nature, he never acquires a
genuine, irreducible principle of sociability and always remains, at bottom, essentially selfish
and asocial. And this constraint implies two basic facts of human nature that in turn lead to
all of the features of Rousseau’s realistic moral psychology. For one, Rousseau provides direct
evidence at the beginning of Book 4 of the Emile. There, he declares that self-love is “the
origin and principle of all the [passions], the only one born with man and which never leaves him
so long as he lives” (212). Thus by nature man loves himself and can never cease doing so; selflove, in other words, is ineffaceable and forms a constraint of nature. The other consists in his
notion that, due to the permanent absence of a social, political component in man’s nature, our
sociability, when it arises, does so only as a development – as a modification or corruption – of
primordial, self-centered passions, desires, or inclinations (e.g., the decay of self-love into amour
propre or loss of self-sufficiency in the pursuit of preservation). Therefore sociability, in
Rousseau’s understanding, can always be reduced to an other-directed passion ultimately rooted
in self-love, or a rational calculation ultimately rooted in self-seeking one’s personal interest.
That man’s sociability can be rooted ultimately only in natural selfishness and never in a

9

This means, for one, that though men possess absolute self-love by nature, they lack the
relative passion amour propre (SD, 147). Lacking amour propre, they lack all its manifestations
– comparative or other-directed sentiments such as vanity, love and jealousy, shame, or the
desire to dominate (SD, 85, 86-87, 147). To the essential human person Rousseau also denies
speech and reason. He believes these faculties do not prove our social nature; rather, they only
represent legacies of the efforts man had to undertake to secure preservation throughout his
history (SD, 91-95).
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genuine principle of natural sociability decisively affects its character throughout Rousseau’s
“critical” and “constructive” thought, furnishing the basis for the morally realistic vision of man
he expresses in it. This can be seen especially in the additional “constraints of nature” which
make up his moral psychology. These constraints attach conditions to and impose limitations
on man’s social and moral capacities and apply, without exception, to all human types. In the
following chapter, I first state the constraints and then support and elaborate them with textual
evidence from Rousseau’s reflections in the Emile, Second Discourse, and political writings.
This discussion leads to an analysis of Rousseau’s doctrine of political legitimacy – the
sovereignty of the general will – in light of the constraints of nature.

CHAPTER 3
THE CONSTRAINTS OF NATURE

The constraints of human nature concern man’s benevolence and can be called the
“amorality (or injustice) of the natural will.” They begin with the notion that because man’s
nature is characterized by self-love, he can only ever will his good and can never bear ill-will
toward himself (SC, 57). But, to this truism, Rousseau adds an additional element drawn from
his notion of human asociality – that for man, always lacking a true social nature, his essential
good never includes the fulfillment of social, political functions, never encompasses the good of
others, and never, therefore, amounts to anything more than the protection of his individual
physical well-being, his property, life and freedom. In other words, Rousseau, through his
principle of asociality, drains the human good of the fulfillment of social duty and morality,
leaving behind a narrowly individualistic conception of it. For this reason, his notion that nature
constrains man’s behavior such that it always tends toward his good implies not only
that he cannot harm himself, but that he always favors himself over others and can never will
their good disinterestedly, that is, wholly for their sakes.
This does not mean that man cannot practice any kind of benevolence for others, but it
does attach to his moral goodness certain conditions. First, man’s benevolence is limited such
that to will, or to respect, the good of others he must have his own secured, or put beyond
threat, first. Or, he can will the good of others if theirs is consistent with his own, or if his own is
secured thereby (i.e., he can want their good as a mercenary means to his own). And second, on
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the obverse, whenever his own good comes into conflict with another’s, he always sacrifices
theirs in favor of his and always inflicts ill on them when self-interest requires it or when he can
gain at their expense. Therefore man, for Rousseau, totally lacks the capacity to act with selfeffacing virtue, to abide by a morality that commands him to love others as he loves himself or
love his enemies or to elevate duties above self-interest in the fashion of Christian charity.
Rousseau clearly subordinates the good of others to self-preference, for example, in his
reformation of traditional moral standards, which, in his rephrasings, exhort man not to deny
himself for others’ sakes but to refrain from imposing needless harm while seeking his own
good. In the reformulated Golden Rule – the “maxim of natural goodness” – Rousseau in just
this way suggests the absolute sacredness of the individual’s good and the subordinate status of
others. The natural morality replaces the “sublime maxim of reasoned justice, Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you” with the “less perfect but perhaps more useful” maxim of
natural goodness: “Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to others” (SD, 85,
emphasis in original). Note that this rephrasing exhorts men not to do others’ good but their
own while refraining from only unnecessary harm, or harm unrelated to securing one’s personal
interest. Sounding the same note in the preface to the Second Discourse, Rousseau insists that,
motivated by self-love and pity, man “will never do harm to another… except in the legitimate
case when, his self-preservation being involved, he is obliged to give preference to himself” (55,
emphasis added). Last, in The State of War, Rousseau says that, when it happens that “one
sentient being’s well-being makes for the other’s evil, each, by the law of nature, gives
preference to itself, regardless of whether it is working to its own advantage or to another’s
prejudice” (173):
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Finally, once things have reached a point where a being endowed with reason is
convinced that his preservation is inconsistent not only with another’s well-being
but with his very existence, he takes up arms against the other’s life and tries to
destroy him as eagerly as he tries to preserve himself, and for the same reason.
(SW, 173)
This notion of the conditionality of our moral goodness can also be seen in a passage from
Book 2 of the Emile that offers another reformulated moral standard. While discussing the
morality appropriate to children, Rousseau makes the following generalization:
Think through all the rules of your education; you will find them misconceived,
especially those that concern virtues and morals. The only lesson appropriate to
childhood, and the most important for every age, is never to harm anyone. (E,
104)
To this exhortation, he adds:
The precept of never hurting another carries with it that of being attached to human
society as little as possible, for in the social state the good of one necessarily
constitutes the harm of another. This relation is in the essence of the thing, and
nothing can change it. On the basis of this principle, let one investigate who is the
better: the social man or the solitary man. An illustrious author says it is only the
wicked man who is alone. I say that it is only the good man who is alone… If the
wicked man were alone, what harm would he do? It is in society that he sets up his
devices for hurting others. (E, 105n)
This condition makes it apparent that observing the moral rule “never to harm anyone” depends
on the individual not needing to do so to secure his good. For if it follows from the fact that the
social state makes all goods zero-sum and conflictual,1 that the only way man can refrain from
harming others is by exiting society altogether and living alone on its fringes, this implies that he
cannot do so by remaining in society but, nevertheless, virtuously setting aside his own good and
1

Rousseau says that “what private interests have in common is so slight that it will never
outweigh what sets them in opposition” (E, 312n). Likewise: “The universal spirit of the laws
of every country is to favor the strong against the weak and those who have against those who
have not. This difficulty is inevitable, and it is without exception” (E, 236n). This is even true
of legitimate civil societies insofar as they include an oppressed underclass of non-citizens (SC,
115). The only exception is the pre-political “savage nation” (Marks, “The Savage Pattern,” 81).
See SD, 94-97, for Rousseau’s description of this state.
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not harming others because it is inherently right, apart from calculations of personal interest.
Said differently, if the difference between “the good man” and “the wicked man” turns on that
the former lives alone and the latter with others, this suggests that the “good man” does no harm
only because, being alone, his self-seeking never gives him an interest in harming them. On the
obverse, for the wicked man to harm no one and thus to be “good,” what he must do is leave
society, rather than practice a social virtue that overcomes self-interest.
Further evidence includes the concrete examples of morally good human types Rousseau
provides and consists in the fact that, in each depiction of a good human type (e.g., of natural
man, Emile, and the citizen), Rousseau always assumes that the individual psychic economy and
social state of the human type under question are such as to meet the condition for moral
benevolence stipulated by this constraint of nature. That is, he always assumes that the morally
good man, as a precondition for his active or passive benevolence, desires nothing more than his
essential, non-zero-sum goods, lives in a state of abundance, already has his own individual good
secured, and that the others toward whom he practices moral goodness pose no threat to it.
Briefly consider the cases of natural man and Emile (I provide an analysis of republican
citizenship in the final chapter). The case of the natural man makes clear, for example, that our
moral goodness depends decisively not on virtue or our ability to check our desires against moral
standards, but rather on the nature of what we take our selfish good to be. And for man in the
original state of nature, due to the moderate character of his amour de soi; his lack of amour
propre and the aggressive, hateful passions that characterize man as he is now; and his lack of
advanced mental faculties such as imagination, memory, foresight, and advanced reason, the
goods he selfishly pursues are limited to simple physical necessities well within his ability to
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provide for himself, without the help of others.2 As Rousseau says in the Second Discourse:
[Natural man’s] desires do not exceed his physical needs. The only goods he
knows in the universe are food, a female, and rest; the only evils he fears are pain
and hunger. (73)
It is this, and not unselfishness, that makes us morally good for others, for these physical
necessities, which nature liberally provides, constitute for this reason non-zero-sum goods that
do not put man’s interests in opposition.

2

Man’s natural moral goodness rests on a set of claims in the Emile and the Second Discourse
regarding his psychic economy. In the Emile Rousseau asserts, “Nature gives [man] with
immediacy only the desire necessary to his preservation and the faculties sufficient to satisfy
them” (80). That is, nature gives man absolute self-love (amour de soi), primitive pity, the
senses and a sturdy physical constitution, all of which are precisely proportioned to his true
goods – i.e., his physical needs. Reflecting on natural self-love in Emile Book 4 Rousseau says
that it, “which regards only ourselves, is contented when our true needs are satisfied,” and it is
“always good and always in conformity with order” (213). Self-love, in other words, since it
gives man only those desires as correspond to his natural powers and real needs, makes him
well-ordered and hence good “for himself.” Moreover unlike amour propre, it is naturally
moderate, not prideful, aggressive, or wicked and only inclines him to seek self-preservation and
delight in his individual existence (which in the state of nature are non-zero-sum) (SD, 82, 85,
147). For this reason self-love also makes man good “for others,” – that is, morally good.
Rousseau says that “what makes man essentially good is to have few needs and to compare
himself little to others; what makes him essentially wicked is to have many needs and to depend
very much on opinion” (E, 214). No less important is what nature denies man. For in addition to
the moderate character of natural self-love, the non-development of his mind constitutes a further
theoretical ground for his moral goodness. As Rousseau argues in the Second Discourse, aside
from the “simple impulsion of nature,” “one can desire or fear things only through the ideas one
can have of them” (73). Thus, it is man’s ability to mentally conceive of goods (especially
through imagination) that, by expanding his notion of his good beyond basic physical necessities,
inflates his passions and desires and turns his self-seeking into wickedness (E, 80-81, 219).
However, because “savage man” is “deprived of every kind of enlightenment,” he “experiences
only… this [simple impulsion]” (SD, 73). Rousseau sums up these reflections in the Second
Discourse: “It could be said that savages are not evil precisely because they do not know what it
is to be good; for it is neither the development of enlightenment nor the restraint of law, but
rather the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice, which prevent them from doing evil”
(82). Therefore it is the moderate character of natural selfishness – not a separate principle of
civility or sociability – that limits natural man’s self-seeking and makes him morally innocent.
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For basically man has no necessary relation with those like himself; he can subsist
in all his vigor without their assistance; he needs not so much the attention of man
as he needs the fruits of the earth; and the earth produces more than enough to
feed all those who dwell on it. (SW, 168)
Therefore, the state of nature and the psychic economy of natural man certainly meet the
condition for our moral goodness and passive benevolence (i.e., not harming others) under this
constraint of nature.3
The same holds for Emile, who receives an elaborate, carefully wrought education that
teaches him to desire nothing more than his true good – the natural freedom (from both physical
restraints and human authority) to which he is subjected throughout youth – and not to desire
false, zero-sum goods, the pursuit of which would make him wicked (by involving him in
dependency relations and opposing his interest to that of others). The tutor so forms Emile’s
character not by thwarting his desires with commands, punishments, or sermonizing, but by
preventing wicked desires from taking root in his heart in the first place. His method is to keep
Emile safe from the destructive effect of corrupt human society, guarding his mind from
opinions, his senses and imagination from extravagant depictions of false goods (e.g., reputation,
fame, political power, luxury), and providing object lessons from history of the folly of the
3

There is another state that, in the Second Discourse, comes between the original state of nature
and the invention of metallurgy and agriculture and which combines sociability and a fair degree
of moral goodness. This is the savage state, which follows upon the “first revolution that
brought about the establishment and differentiation of families and that introduced a sort of
property” (94). This state develops men’s minds to the extent necessary for amour propre and
the other passions that flow from it. Thus savage man becomes sensitive to honor and public
esteem and capable of receiving offense. This compromises his moral goodness to some extent,
for “vengeance became terrible and men became bloodthirsty and cruel” (SD, 96). However, this
state is also characterized by a significant degree of independence, and, crucially, does not
feature conflicts over claims to property or stark opposition of interests. Therefore it does not
descend to a war of all against all. Rousseau calls the savage state “the happiest and most
durable epoch” and “the best for man” (SD, 97). In his article “The Savage Pattern: The Unity
of Rousseau’s Thought Revisited,” Marks argues that Rousseau’s praise of this state suggests
that for him, the human good is a composite of elements of both independence and sociability.
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pursuit of human “greatness.” Thus he retains, like the natural man, a moral goodness founded
on the limited scope of his desires, in no way dependent on the exercise of painful virtue or
self-discipline.4

4

Rousseau articulates the whole basis of his educational method in Book 2 of the Emile: “Let
us set down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right.
There is no original perversity in the human heart. There is not a single vice to be found in it of
which it cannot be said how and whence it entered” (92). Therefore, since human nature
contains no principle of wickedness (e.g., Christian original sin), the formation of moral
character does not take its bearings by the need to preach moral precepts or combat vice with
virtue: hence the method “negative education,” which “consists not at all in teaching virtue or
truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error” (E, 93). Accordingly, Emile’s
education does not raise him up to an elevated moral ideal, but preserve his native goodness from
the corrupting influence of human society.
First, in childhood, the tutor never directly preaches morality, but subjects the pupil to nature,
not wills, so as to prevent the premature birth of amour propre until “the guide of amour propre,
which is reason, can be born” (E, 92). To this end, he entirely refrains from issuing positive
commands (with associated rewards and punishments) and instead subjects the pupil solely to
“well-regulated freedom” (E, 92). “One enchains, pushes, and restrains him with the bonds of
necessity alone” (E, 92), rather than with fickle wills. This approach “make[s] him patient,
steady, resigned, calm, even when he has not got what he wanted, for it is in the nature of man to
endure patiently the necessity of things but not the ill will of others” (E, 91). By thus guarding
against the “mastery and slavery” dynamic and opposition of wills, the child so raised never
acquires anger or the desire to dominate.
The subsequent moral formation of the young man Emile is based on the same premise and
uses the same approach. Rousseau says at the beginning of Book 4: “Our natural passions are
very limited. They are the instruments of our freedom; they tend to preserve us. All those which
subject us and destroy us come from elsewhere. Nature does not give them to us. We
appropriate them to the detriment of nature” (E, 212). The passions, then, are not necessarily
evil, though since they are malleable they “can be directed to good or bad” (E, 214). Thus the
tutor does not combat the passions. Instead, primarily through the judicious manipulation of
imagination and budding reason, he forms Emile’s moral character by channeling them toward
morally good passions such as “goodness, humanity, commiseration, beneficence, and all the
attractive and sweet passions naturally pleasing to men” while staving off “envy, covetousness,
hate, and all the repulsive and cruel passions which make sensibility… negative and torment the
man who experiences them” (E, 223). Upon reaching sexual maturity, the tutor similarly
maintains Emile’s chastity prior to marriage not by condemning his new desires but by forming
his moral taste and making him long for an imaginative ideal, the chaste “Sophie” (E, 317, 321,
323-325, 328-329). And should Emile’s new desires ever run counter to the tutor’s guidance,
rather than baldly asserting his authority or imposing his will, the tutor coaxes and persuades
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While the constraints of nature do permit moral goodness in the situations discussed
above that satisfy it, in states in which they are not met, man’s partiality and self-preference,
based on self-love, inclines him to act with positive wickedness and exploitative intent toward
others. That is, in any state in which man desires zero-sum goods, has opposed interests,
depends on others, or that provides him with opportunities to gain at their expense, his
permanent, basic nature – i.e., his self-love coupled with the lack of separate moralpsychological resources capable of overcoming it – precludes moral goodness and, in quasideterministic fashion, inclines him to inflict ill on others. Therefore, though innocent and
“good” on the fringes of society or in the state of nature, in the state of society that does not
meet the conditions that the constraints of nature attach to moral goodness (i.e., society in the
pejorative sense based on personal dependence, not legitimate civil society), self-love biases to
an extravagant degree man’s will toward his narrow individualistically conceived good and
Emile to submit voluntarily while relying on his sentimental attachment to the tutor (E, 316, 325326).
This, however, changes in Book 5 when Emile meets Sophie and contracts the passion love.
Now, Emile’s happiness and goodness no longer depend on him alone, but on both the will and
the fate of Sophie (E, 415-416, 419, 430-431). Thus, after it is decided that Emile and Sophie
are to be married, the tutor preaches virtue to Emile, for as a married man he can no longer be
only good but must rule his new passion and become virtuous (E, 442-446). This might weaken
my contention that moral benevolence depends on limited desires, not virtue. However, it is
revealing that the tutor ends his discourse with special emphasis on the requirement of virtue for
happiness, not moral duty (though to be sure he does not ignore moral duty). Moreover, the
tutor’s understanding of the parameters of happiness is identical to that found in the discussion of
happiness in Emile Book 2 – that is, happiness requires equilibrium of desires and the power to
satisfy them (80-84). But there is nothing inherently social or moral about this definition of
happiness. The account of virtue in the Emile, then, suggests Orwin’s claim that virtue’s
justification rests on its usefulness for promoting human happiness or the human good, which is
at bottom asocial (“Rousseau on the Sources of Ethics,” 69). Ultimately, however, it must be
admitted that the adult Emile’s acquisition of virtue poses a difficulty for this essay’s core thesis
– that man never acquires an irreducible principle of sociability that limits self-love. I address
this objection in the penultimate chapter.
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produces human wickedness.
For evidence for this aspect of the constraints of nature Rousseau’s frequent hyperbolic
denunciations of the wickedness of civilized man can obviously be cited (SD, 127-133). But, as
passages in the political works show, he also grounds this misanthropic rhetoric in his theoretical
first principles. Consider the second chapter of the Geneva Manuscript fragment, where
Rousseau rejects the traditional Golden Rule by viewing it precisely in terms of man’s natural
asociality and of his will as determined solely by self-love:
It is a beautiful and sublime precept to do unto others as we would wish to be
done unto; but is it not evident, that far from serving as the foundation of justice,
it is itself in need of foundation; for what is the clear and solid reason for my
behaving, being myself, according to the will I would have if I were someone
else? (160-161)
The crucial reflection behind this can be pinpointed in the following curious elaboration of this
point:
Would not a judge who condemns a criminal wish to be absolved if he himself
were a criminal? Where is the man who would not wish never to have anything
refused him? does it follow that we must grant everything that is asked of us?
(161)
Here, Rousseau drains the Golden Rule of considerations based on the natural law and the
common good and examines it in terms of the content of individual wills constrained by man’s
amoral, basic nature, for while the traditional Golden Rule usually assumes that we want from
others (and hence must return) simply recognition of the dignity due to us as human beings
subject to the natural law, apparently for Rousseau, man – governed not by sociability, reason, or
the natural law but by self-love and caring not for the common good – wants others not to treat
him with decency but to serve the most fantastic version of his selfish good. Rousseau, then,
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rejects the Golden Rule in part because he assumes the extravagant injustice and amorality of the
natural will and thus sees it as attempting – ridiculously, from this perspective – to make the
selfish desires of others the guide of right moral conduct.
Rousseau also expresses this low view of man’s natural moral character in major political
works such as the Social Contract. In that work especially, though he takes a high view of
the general will (attributing to it, for example, moral infallibility), he also claims that “each
individual may, as a man, have a particular will contrary to or different from the general will he
has as a Citizen” (52). Rousseau considers the activity of this “particular will” (a technical term
of the Contract equivalent to the individual’s natural will) an enduring, cold, hard fact of civil
man’s moral psychology, and managing it is the major problem of politics (Poland, 179). This is
because, as he says in The State of War, “though citizens call themselves members of the state,
they cannot join it as true members are joined to the body; it is impossible so to arrange things
that each one of them not have an individual and separate existence which enables him to attend
to his preservation by himself” (169-170). Since indeed the political state is nothing more than a
“being of reason” (i.e., a legal fiction), “not a [physical] man,” (SC, 53) and since its fate
therefore can be separated from that of the real, physical individuals who make it up, man’s
“absolute and naturally independent existence may lead him to look upon what he owes to the
common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will harm others less than its
payment burdens him” (SC, 52-53). Rousseau calls this “an injustice, the progress of which
would cause the ruin of the body politic” (SC, 53).
Unfortunately, this problem is insoluble since it manifests the constraint of nature that
inclines civil man’s will to injustice. Rousseau makes this explicit in the Social Contract, “Of
the Principle Which Constitutes the Various Forms of Government.” There he announces the
following principle:
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In a perfect legislation, the particular or individual will should be null, the
Government’s own corporate will should be very subordinate, and consequently
the general or sovereign will should always be dominant and the sole rule of all
the others. (87)
But a perfect state can never exist because, as Rousseau continues:
According to the natural order… the more concentrated these different wills are,
the more active they grow. Thus the general will is always the weakest, the
corporate will occupies second place, and the particular will the first place of all:
so that in the Government each member is first of all himself, and then
Magistrate, and then citizen. A gradation that is the direct opposite of that
required by the social order. (88)
This means that, though the sovereignty of the general will, hypothetically speaking, makes for a
perfect, morally infallible standard of rule, this abstract standard directly contradicts the
permanent nature of real, physical men as biased in their own selfish interests. It may be, as
Rousseau says, that “the general will is always upright and always tends to the public utility: but
it does not follow… that the people’s deliberations are always equally upright” (SC, 59,
emphasis added). Indeed, Rousseau regards the corruption of the citizen body and the descent of
legitimate government into despotism as an historical inevitability. Thus good politics, because
it always ultimately succumbs to the pernicious activity of natural individual wills, represents no
permanent solution to the problems Rousseau’s philosophy poses (SC, 109; SD, 112-117).5
Rousseau’s writings contain two more constraints that are derivative from the
constraints on benevolence, closely related to each other and crucially important for the
formulation of political legitimacy. First, the “injustice of man’s natural will” implies a

5

As Masters says, “Nature is the standard by which any civil society can be adjudged faulty,
since all political orders are imperfect human creations doomed to ultimate failure; man’s nature
and the demands of civil society are intrinsically opposed to each other” (Political Philosophy,
257). See also Melzer, Natural Goodness, 112-113.
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constraint of nature that renders him totally incapable of looking after the interests of others,
should they be made subject to his will. Indeed, rather than looking after their interests, this
constraint inclines the man in the position of power to ferociously exploit, for his own benefit,
those under his rule. And this fact of our moral psychology allows for no exceptions; under it
nothing qualifies men for just rule over others. In other words, according to Rousseau, it follows
from the constraints of nature that no man in a position of rule over others, despite virtue,
wisdom, or any other kind of personal merit, can seek the good of those over whom he wields
power, simply because he has a natural will constrained to prefer himself over others and to
exploit them in his own interest if he can.
Rousseau embeds the constraint according to which rulers cannot seek the good of their
subjects in his “principles of political right,” the topic of the next chapter. However, he also
provides some explicit textual evidence for it. For example, he suggests this constraint in a
passage from the Second Discourse that claims there is no greater evil than to be at the mercy of
another man’s will, to be exposed to all of his whims. Rousseau says that “the worst thing that
can happen in the relations between one man and another is for one of them to find himself at the
other’s discretion” (105). He also suggests it in his critique of the attempt to prove the sovereign
rights of kings by way of an analogy to natural paternal authority. In refuting this philosophical
move, Rousseau ignores the question of superior wisdom and focuses instead on the observation
that though nature inclines fathers to actually love and desire to care for their children, it gives
opposite inclinations to leaders of men:
Indeed, while the voice of nature is the best counsel a good father should heed in
order to fulfill his duties well, it is for the magistrate nothing but a false guide
which constantly tends to distance him from his duties. (PE, 5)
As Rousseau says, “The father’s duties are dictated to him by natural sentiments, and in a tone
that rarely allows him to disobey” (PE, 3). However, “it is these very [natural] inclinations that
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corrupt the magistrate” (PE, 5). “Far from the chief’s having a natural interest in the happiness
of private individuals, it is not uncommon for him to seek his own happiness in their misery”
(PE, 4; see also SC, 42, and SD, 107). Last, one can cite the low view of monarchy Rousseau
takes in the Social Contract, “Of Monarchy,” which argues that though monarchical regimes
govern with more energy than other governments:
[t]here is none where the particular will has greater sway and more easily
dominates the other wills; everything proceeds toward the same goal… but that
goal is not public felicity, and the very force of the Administration works to the
prejudice of the state. (95)
Indeed, for Rousseau monarchy seems to offer the purest example of this general tendency:
“Just as the particular will incessantly acts against the general will, so the Government makes a
constant effort against Sovereignty” (SC, 106).6
Before explaining the next constraint of nature – freedom from the personal wills of
others – note that Rousseau tends to view as the greatest human good, the summum bonum of the
individual, “negative” freedom – the free-flowing, unopposed action of the human will (E, 84;
SC, 45; SD, 108).7 This can easily be deduced from the foregoing, for if natural self-love
permanently inclines the will of the individual to seek the good of the individual, to prefer
himself over all others, and, if able, to harm them whenever it suits his self-interest, it obviously

6

In the Social Contract, “Of the Abuse of Government and of Its Tendency to Degenerate,”
Rousseau says that “it would follow from Aristotle’s distinction [between the true monarch who
rules in the public interest and the tyrant who rules in his own] that there had never yet existed a
single King since the beginning of the world” (108n).
7

In “The Origin of the Counter-Enlightenment: Rousseau and the New Religion of Sincerity,”
Melzer calls Rousseau the “philosopher of freedom” (348). For freedom as Rousseau’s
governing concept and highest value, see Masters, Political Philosophy, 254, 424, 430; Melzer,
Natural Goodness, 82-84, 91; Strauss, Natural Right and History, 277-279, 281-282, 293-294.

25

follows, first, that, as has been cited, for Rousseau the subjection of one’s will to that of others is
a great evil, and, second, that, as he says in the Emile, therefore “the first of all goods is not
authority but freedom” (84). Thus the fundamental good natural self-love inclines the individual
to secure and protect is the freedom of his will from the personal wills of others. And this
constitutes the second derivative constraint on human benevolence. That is, Rousseau’s moral
psychology contains the notion that nature constrains man in such a way that he does not submit
his will to the wills of other men.8
Like the previous constraint of nature, Rousseau embeds this in his formulation of
political legitimacy. However, the interpreter can glean some support in the view of civil
society’s essential character Rousseau expresses in passages throughout his writings that bear
its mark. This view says that social and political relations in most civil societies, though they
offer to the superficial spectator a thin veneer of order and harmony, in reality have at their base
a disorder and disharmony that renders them always unstable (E, 194; SD 55). Society’s radical
disorder emerges from a facet of Rousseauian moral psychology Melzer calls “‘the power of the
inner’ or alternatively ‘the natural intractability of man’”:9
In Rousseau’s view, men are naturally closed in on themselves, individual
monads whose happiness and being come from within. And for this reason it is
extremely difficult for anything that comes from without to gain a real hold on

8

However, it is also true that Rousseau believes men can be corrupted to the extent that they
trade away freedom for other goods (SD, 112) or become habituated to slavery (SC, 43; SD, 106,
116). But see Melzer, Natural Goodness, 167n. There, Melzer argues that though men can
acquire an inclination to obey, it is not strong enough to ground the state’s legitimacy and
stability by itself.
9

Natural Goodness, 46.
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them, whether it be knowledge one would like to impart to them, or a religion one
would like to impose, or political authority one wants to assert.10
In consequence, Rousseau insists on the futility, given our nature, which makes us resistant to
authority, of the quest for power over other men’s wills. As he announces in the Emile:
“[Man’s] freedom and [his] power extend only as far as [his] natural strength and not beyond….
[He] can do what he like[s]: never will [his] real authority go farther than [his] real
faculties” (83-84). As Melzer says, for Rousseau it is no small task to command others: “Do
what you will, they go their own way, they slip every snare, they are naturally free in this
sense.”11

10
11

Ibid.

Corresponding to this view, Rousseau’s politics downgrade the value of order as compared
with liberty in spite of the turbulence it often accompanies (E 213; SC 106n; SD 106).

CHAPTER 4
THE CONSTRAINTS OF NATURE AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

On first blush, it might appear that Rousseau’s political theory denies the constraints of
nature, for the political works typically present a high-toned and idealistic, not realistic, moral
vision, and this vision seems to spring from an optimistic view of the open-endedness of human
nature, not a pessimistic view that emphasizes constraints and limits. Indeed, Rousseau’s politics
portray the possibility of taking the “absolute whole” – natural man – and denaturing him into a
true citizen who wills the common good rather than his own selfish interest (E, 39-40; SC, 69).
Against Hobbes and Locke, for whom man’s character and dispositions remain the same before
and after the social contract, Rousseau views the institution of civil society as producing a
wholesale transformation of selfish human nature:
This transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most
remarkable change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and
endowing his actions with the morality they previously lacked. (SC, 53)
Moreover, many of Rousseau’s statements in the political works suggest he endorsed the
possibility of radical social engineering, for example, the legislator, “to institute a people must
feel capable of… changing human nature” (SC, 69). And not just the legislator, but the
executive, as well, undertakes this task by forming and educating citizens, instilling in them
patriotism and love of the laws: “Certain it is in the long run peoples are what government
makes them be” (PE, 13).
However, in the analysis to follow, I argue against these appearances and attempt to
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show that Rousseau’s political theory, despite the fiery, moralistic tone with which he conveys it,
respects all the constraints of nature discussed above. To do so, I first describe Rousseau’s
understanding of the character of political legitimacy in general. Then, I examine the notions of
social contract and general will to demonstrate that their defining philosophical features
presuppose the constraints of nature. To conclude, I use the constraints to clarify the status of
natural rights in the legitimate state and the moral infallibility of the sovereign and briefly
discuss the primary objection to this chapter’s essential thesis, namely, civil man’s acquisition of
sociability as moral freedom and virtue.1

The Character of Political Legitimacy

In the first instance, the constraints of nature inform Rousseau’s conceptions of civil
society, the common good, justice, and law in that he always relates them to the goals of
individual preservation, property, and liberty and in doing so aligns himself with the modern,
realistic tradition traceable to Machiavelli and Hobbes. This tradition denies that man is the
political being and therefore sees civil society as extrinsic to man’s nature and justice and the
common good as nothing but means for individual utility understood as security of interests and
rights to goods by their nature apolitical (i.e., they exist in a pre-political state of nature).
Accordingly, it regards practicing justice and contributing to the common good as conditional
imperatives to which man adheres solely in order to get his individual interest served. This
means that for this tradition, justice has a mercenary foundation; it has real force, effectiveness,
1

This chapter’s account of the political theory of the Social Contract is heavily influenced by
the morally realistic interpretation of the general will. See Masters, Political Philosophy, 303304, 315-323, 348-353, and Melzer, Natural Goodness, 150-179.
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and ability to affect behavior only in virtue of the utility that accrues to the just by way of their
being just. Last, it adds that the coincidence of justice and utility depends on positive laws and
political institutions, which, by providing sanctions for law breaking, prevent the exploitation of
the just by the unjust. Therefore, justice has no practical existence in a pre-political state of
nature or among men qua men because in these cases the lack of a common power deprives it of
the enforcing power necessary to ground it in rational self-interest.2
Rousseau gives these basic views of the origin and relevance of civil society, justice, and
common good in the Second Discourse and the Geneva Manuscript, respectively. In the former,
he argues that civil society came into being historically as a means to secure landed property
(SD, 91). The connection between civil society and landed property runs as follows: The
cultivation of land leads to a superfluity of material goods and a novel inequality between “rich”
and “poor.” And though continual cultivation and division of land lead the possessors, the
“rich,” to claim a right to it, this “right of the first occupant” is moot because it cannot be backed
by physical force. Rather, in the state of nature, the absence of political institutions leaves
owners fully exposed to attack by the superior force of the dispossessed, who, being themselves
without the means of survival, legitimately claim a right to their goods. Thus:
A perpetual conflict arose between the right of the stronger and the right of the
first occupant which ended only in fights and murders. Nascent society gave way
to the most horrible state of war. (SD, 101)
The rich conspire to end the state of war and secure their property with an enforceable right by
engaging their enemies, the poor, in the defense of their goods through the invention of civil
society and the law. Though Rousseau acknowledges “that some have attributed other origins to
2

For a more complete discussion of modern political realism, see Masters, Political Philosophy,
261-268; Melzer, Natural Goodness, 116-117, 126-146; Strauss, Natural Right and History, 166202.
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political societies,” he believes this “to be the most natural” (SD, 104):
That, since the poor have nothing to lose except their freedom, it would have been
a very foolish act for them to give away voluntarily the sole good remaining to
them without getting anything in exchange. That, on the contrary, since the rich
were, so to speak, sensitive in every part of their goods, it was much easier to
harm them; they consequently had more precautions to take to protect themselves
from harm. And that, finally, it is reasonable to believe that a thing was invented
by those for whom it is useful than by those it does harm. (SD, 104, emphasis
added)
Thus, Rousseau believes the rich invented civil society because they had more to gain from it,
thereby indicating that the political community is, essentially, a tool for their interests.3
Rousseau’s refutation in the Geneva Manuscript of the practical reality of natural justice
among men qua men also demonstrates his allegiance to these views. There, Rousseau
concludes that natural justice is irrelevant because it fails to serve personal interests. As he says,
since “in the natural order of things… particular interest and the general good… exclude one
another,… social laws are a yoke which everyone is willing to impose on others, but not to
assume himself” (156). His speaker, the “independent man” (a rational individual living in the
state of nature), articulates the reasoning. At the outset, he assumes, “It is not a matter of
teaching me what justice is; it is a matter of showing me what interest I have in being just”
(Geneva, 157). Given this, he emphasizes that justice does not serve personal interest in the state
of nature due to the lack of any guarantee of reciprocity and good faith on the part of others:
“I feel I bring mankind terror and trouble,” says the independent man whom the
wise man stifles, “but the alternative is that either I am miserable, or I make
others miserable, and no one is dearer to me than I myself am.” “It is vain,” he
might add, “that I would endeavor to reconcile my own interest with that of
others; everything you tell me about the advantages of the social law might be
fine, if while I scrupulously observed it toward the rest, I were sure that they
would all observe it toward me; but what assurance can you give me on this
3

In many passages Rousseau indicates that civil society and the law are founded on property
interests. See for example SC, 56n, 78n; PE, 19, 23, 29.
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score… Either give me guarantees against every unjust undertaking, or give up
my hope of refraining from them in turn. It makes no difference that you tell me
that by repudiating the duties which natural law imposes on me, I simultaneously
deprive myself of its rights, and that my acts of violence will authorize all those
which others might choose to commit against me. I accept it all the more readily
as I do not see how my moderation might guarantee me against them.” (Geneva,
156, quotations in original)
That is, in considering what his interest requires in the state of nature, the independent man
calculates that, there being no enforcing power to uphold reciprocity and punish injustice, he
cannot secure his personal interest by being just, but instead must always have recourse to
exercising his natural right to do anything and everything – including harming others – in the
interest of his preservation. Under the constraints of nature, he can never lay down this right
because, no matter how just and moral his behavior toward others, he can have no guarantee that
this will elicit benevolence on the part of them toward himself. Far more advantageous for him
to reserve the right to harm others when it suits his interest in self-defense than to attempt justice
and risk others breaking faith and taking advantage of him.

Social Contract and General Will

It is a different matter, of course, in civil society, where the addition of artificial political
institutions can bend rational calculations of self-interest toward justice. As Rousseau concludes
the first chapter of the Geneva Manuscript:
By means of new associations, let us correct, if possible, the lack of a general
association. Let our violent interlocutor himself be the judge of our success… Let
him behold in a better constitution of things the worth of good deeds, the
punishment of bad ones, the endearing harmony of justice and happiness. (159)
Rousseau depicts this “better constitution of things” in the Social Contract, the work in which he
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articulates his views of the structure of legitimate political association. At the beginning of the
work he claims that, “taking men as they are… I shall try always to combine what right permits
with what interest prescribes, so that justice and utility may not be disjoined” (41). Rousseau
indeed achieves this by formulating his principles of legitimacy in such a way as to satisfy all of
the constraints of nature. But before explaining how, a summary of the basic features of
legitimacy found in the Social Contract is in order.
Rousseau “assume[s] men having reached the point where the obstacles that interfere
with their preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces which each
individual can muster to maintain himself in that state” (SC, 49). And therefore, having lost their
primitive self-sufficiency, they “are left with no other means of self-preservation than to form…
a sum of forces that might prevail over those obstacles’ resistance” (SC, 49). To create this “sum
of forces,” independent men have no other choice than to cooperate by engaging themselves in a
political community via unanimous, voluntary subordination of each to a common power under
the following condition stipulated by the social contract:
These clauses… all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of each
associate with all of his rights to the whole community. (SC, 50)
By the “total alienation,” “the condition is equal for all” (SC, 50). And by it, since the whole
community receives the individual and all his rights, “he gives himself to no one, and since there
is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same right as one grants him over oneself,
one gains the equivalent of all one loses” (SC, 50). In short, the political community as
established by the reciprocal social contract “produces a moral and collective body made up of as
many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives by this same act its unity, its
common self, its life and its will” (SC, 50). And this “common will” – the general will – is, by
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the social contract, sovereign:
If, then, one sets aside everything that is not of the essence of the social compact,
one finds that it can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person
and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will.
(SC, 50, emphasis in original)
Thus the defining feature of legitimate civil society established by the social contract is
popular sovereignty, or the sovereignty of the general will of the whole community. But what is
“general will”? Rousseau argues that it involves two generalities – of “source” and of
“application”: “The general will, to be truly such, must be so in its object as well as in its
essence, that it must issue from all in order to apply to all” (SC, 62, emphasis added). The first,
generality of source, means that legitimate sovereign will comes from the whole community, not
any part of the community (SC, 57, 70, 110, 114). Thus sovereignty is not general will
“virtually,” or by proxy via a representative who wills on behalf of the community; it is general
will as a real, “empirical” fact. This places rightful sovereign authority in the institution of an
assembly of all the citizens, each of whom, by the social contract, is placed at parity with all
others in terms of the degree of political weight with which he can influence the content of
sovereign wills.4 The second, generality of application, means that legitimate sovereign will, in
its object, takes no cognizance whatsoever of discrete, particular persons; rather, its commands,
the rights it bestows, the burdens it imposes, apply uniformly to all – that is, identically to every
member of society, with no exceptions. This limits the purview of rightful sovereignty to objects
4

This can be deduced from the fact that, as Rousseau says, it “is a consequence of the contract
itself [that] the vote of the majority always obligates all the rest” (SC, 124). If this is so, it must
be because the contract bestows on all associates one, and only one vote, which implies that a
law can only pass if it gains in its favor a combination of the greater number of votes – hence
majority rule.

34

of common concern, regulated by general conventions – that is, strictly to the legislative power
or to laws, but never to their application to particular individuals in particular cases (SC, 62-63,
67).
Since an act of human will establishes civil society,5 this formulation of legitimacy must
be decisively affected by the content of human wills, and hence by the constraints of nature.
Rousseau suggests precisely this in “the fundamental problem to which the social contract
provides the solution” (SC, 49-50):
‘To find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods
of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each,
uniting with all nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.’
(SC, 49, quotations in original)
In other words, political association, the “sum of forces,” to be legitimate must serve the
individual interests of all associates by securing the essential, natural goods (self-preservation,
integrity of person and property) nature constrains all men to pursue. And to do so, since the
“force and freedom” of each individual “are his primary instruments of self-preservation” (SC,
49), it must, while combining together independent men, also maximize their freedom of will
from the authority of the personal wills of others. As Rousseau says in the Second Discourse,
“It is… incontestable, and it is the fundamental maxim of all political right, that peoples have
given themselves leaders to defend their freedom and not to enslave them” (105).
Rousseau introduces the requirement that society maximize the freedom of all associates
through the sovereignty of the general will in order to satisfy the constraints of nature, for recall
5

In the Social Contract, “Of Slavery,” Rousseau says that “since no man has a natural authority
over his fellow-man, and since force produces no right, conventions remain as the basis of all
legitimate authority among men” (44). And in the Social Contract, “Of Suffrage,” he calls “civil
association… the most voluntary act in the world” (123). This chapter therefore accepts
Plattner’s statement: “The general will… has no foundation outside the wills of citizens” (State
of Nature, 114).

35

that nature inclines the wills of all men to prioritize their individual good over others and to harm
them in the pursuit of their interest. Therefore, political rule, if it is to secure the essential goods
of all members of society, cannot be any sort that subjects anyone’s will to rule by some
particular individual or group of individuals. It cannot, that is, be the rule of one, a few, or many
over the whole community. “Rule,” in short, as Melzer says, “cannot be something that one
party does to an ‘other.’”6 Rather, within the limit of the constraints of nature, the only sort of
political rule that can cause society to serve the preservation of person and property of all its
members is the impersonal, literal “rule of all over each”7 – the self-rule of the general will.
For this, unlike every form of personal rule, arranges sovereignty institutionally in such a way as
to thwart the natural injustice of the will, protect each member’s freedom, and accommodate the
constraints.8

6

Natural Goodness, 182.

7

Ibid., 181.

8

Rousseau makes this explicit in the Social Contract. He asserts that “the end of [civil
society]… is the common good: for while the opposition of particular interests made the
establishment of societies necessary… the agreement of these same interests… made it possible”
(57). “Now it is solely in terms of this common interest that society ought to be governed” (SC,
57). But this is a truism. What is radical, and what distinguishes Rousseau’s view, here is
therefore not the notion that civil society has as its end the common good, but rather the
insistence “that the general will alone can [so] direct the forces of the State” (57, emphasis
added). Likewise, in the Dedication to Geneva from the Second Discourse: “I would have
wished to be born in a country where the sovereign and the people could have only one and the
same interest, so that all the movements of the machine always tended only to the common
happiness. Since this would not be possible unless the people and the sovereign were one and
the same person, it follows that I would have wished to be born under a democratic regime,
wisely tempered” (42, emphasis added). This notion that only the general will can secure the
general interest is another way of expressing the notion that rulers cannot seek the good of the
ruled. This in turn follows from the “injustice of the natural will.” Rousseau says, “Indeed,
while it is not impossible that a particular will agree with the general will on some point, it is in
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How does the general will meet the constraints? Consider first the generality of source.
As mentioned above, this aspect of legitimate sovereignty distributes political power evenly
across all members of society by bestowing on each of them only one vote. Rousseau believes
that this, along with the mechanism of majority rule, causes all unjust personal interests to cancel
themselves out in the sovereign’s decisions. Thus, as he says in the Political Economy, “The
general will is always for the common good” (8). Rousseau explains this “natural disposition”
(PE, 8) of legitimate sovereignty in the Social Contract, “Whether the General Will Can Err”:
There is often a considerable difference between the will of all and the general
will: the latter looks only to the common interest, the former looks to private
interest, and is nothing but a sum of particular wills; but if, from these same wills,
one takes away the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, what is left as
the sum of the differences is the general will. (60)
This occurs because the reciprocity of political equality prevents anyone, if he advances an
unjust interest in the assembly, from doing so with a degree of political power sufficient to
surmount the opposition to such interests on the part of everyone (rooted in man’s natural
aversion to the authority of personal wills). Therefore, even if no particular member ever wills
the common good, the sovereign still upholds it indirectly via the constant opposition by all
members to the private interest of each of them (SC, 60n). In other words, the “generality of
source” cancels out all private interests, first, because it guarantees that if an unjust interest is
asserted, it is matched, surmounted, and successfully opposed. And, second, because, due to its
reciprocity, it guarantees that if any among those who oppose it assert an unjust interest in their
turn, it is also matched, surmounted and successfully opposed. By thus aggregating the “willagainst-oppression” of each member against every other, this arrangement defeats all private
any event impossible for this agreement to be lasting and constant; for the particular will tends,
by its nature to partiality, and the general will to equality” (SC, 57, emphasis added).
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interests, thus thwarting the natural injustice of the will and accommodating the constraint
regarding the inability of rulers to seek the good of the ruled. In addition, by equally registering
all wills in the sovereign’s decisions, it also satisfies the constraint according to which men obey
only themselves.9
As for the generality of application, this feature of legitimate sovereignty also
accommodates the constraints, though in a slightly different manner. Recall first that this feature
requires the sovereign to deliberate only about general objects, or objects that concern the whole,
but never about particular individuals or groups. Rousseau considers this, like the generality of
source, absolutely necessary for a common good, for it produces “an admirable agreement
between interest and justice which confers on common deliberations a character of equity that is
seen to vanish in the discussion of any particular affair” (SC, 62). Why does justice “vanish” in
deliberations on particular questions? It vanishes, as Rousseau continues, “for want of a
common interest which unites and identifies the rule of the judge with that of the party” (SC, 62).
This is because, given the “injustice of the natural will,” whenever the sovereign regards
9

With Rousseau’s conception of the general will, “one need no longer ask… how one is both
free and subject to the laws, since they are merely records of our wills” (SC, 67). But there is an
obvious objection to this, namely, since the sovereign people rules through institutional
majorities, not necessarily unanimities, “the question is raised how a man can be both free and
forced to conform to wills which are not his own. How are the opponents [of the majority] both
free and subject to laws to which they have not consented?” (SC, 124). To this objection
Rousseau answers that citizens are only free in virtue of the sovereignty of the general will (SC,
124). Therefore, “[i]f my particular opinion had prevailed, I would have done something other
than what I had willed, and it is then that I would not have been free” (SC, 124). Rousseau’s
explanation, however, comes with the qualification “that all the characteristics of the general will
are still in the majority: once they no longer are, then regardless of the side one takes there no
longer is any freedom” (SC, 124). The qualification gets to the heart of the matter, for when
citizens obey institutional majorities, they do not obey the majority per se (or the majority’s
will), but the majority only insofar as it is assumed to convey the general will. For this point see
also Melzer, Natural Goodness, 160-162, 170n.
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particulars, it immediately splits the whole between the particulars in question and the rest, with
the constraints inclining each party to seek unjust interests that harm the other. Thus the general
will “loses its natural rectitude when it tends toward some individual and determinate object”
(SC, 62). As Rousseau elaborates:
In such a suit, where interested private individuals are one of the parties, and the
public the other, I do not see what law should be followed or what judge should
pronounce judgment. It would be ridiculous, under these circumstances, to try to
invoke an express decision of the general will, which can only be the decision of
one of the parties, and is, therefore, as far as the other party is concerned, nothing
but a foreign, particular will which on this occasion is inclined to injustice and
subject to error. (SC, 62)
And therefore, since the constraints of nature preclude reconciliation of interests where the fate
of particular individuals is concerned, “there is,” as Rousseau says, “no general will about a
particular object” (SC, 66). As he concludes the second chapter of the Geneva Manuscript:
It is therefore in the fundamental and universal Law of the greatest good of all and
not in the particular relations of man to man that one has to look for the true
principles of the just and the unjust. (161)
Whereas particular questions oppose the selfish interests of specific individuals or
groups, the “general question” concerning the whole thwarts the natural injustice of the will by
redirecting self-interests toward the common good. Like the generality of source, it does so via
reciprocity:
From whatever side one traces one’s way back to the principle, one always
reaches the same conclusion: namely, that the social pact establishes among the
Citizens an equality such that all commit themselves under the same conditions
and must all enjoy the same rights. (SC, 62-63)
For this very reason, “since the condition is equal for all, no one has any interest in making it
burdensome to the rest” (SC, 50).
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Rousseau’s argument presupposes the constraints of nature and natural self-preference.
How so? Though the constraints incline the individual to assert selfish interests in the
sovereign’s deliberations, the sovereign, via the “generality of application,” rectifies them by
forcing him to state them in the form of laws that apply uniformly to all. Therefore, if anyone in
the sovereign claims for himself, for example, a right to harm others, he must will it universally,
granting to each the right to do the same to all. But because he cannot harm others without also
thereby bringing harm upon all, hence himself, the constraint according to which man cannot
seek his own ill forces him to forsake selfish interests in responding to the general question and
instead will the good of all. In other words, since it is axiomatic that none seek their own ill, and
since the sovereign forces individuals to respond only to the general question, they prefer the
common good simply because in no other way can they secure their own. As Rousseau says,
since the general will forges an identity between the fate of each and all, “one cannot injure one
of the members without attacking the body, and still less can one injure the body without the
members being affected. Thus duty and interest alike obligate the contracting parties to help one
another” (SC, 52). Again, this feature of legitimate sovereignty also means the individual
obeys only himself because, since he obeys general laws, not persons, in obeying the sovereign
he does nothing more than follow the rational requirements of his own interest (which, in the
social state necessarily includes the good of others).10

10

Rousseau asks in the Political Economy, “By what inconceivable art were the means found to
subjugate men in order to make them free?” (9). This is “the work of law. It is to law alone that
men owe justice and freedom.” (PE, 10). Of course, the social contract replaces the full natural
freedom to do as one pleases with the freedom to do only what the law permits, i.e., with civil
liberty (SC 53-54). But though civil society subtracts from natural freedom, because it secures
against personal dependence, it satisfies the constraint of nature regarding freedom (which has to
do with particular oppression). As Rousseau says, “What any man, regardless of who he may be,
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These considerations show that the defining feature of legitimacy – the general will and
“double generality” of source and application (popular sovereignty and the rule of law,
respectively) – which causes the legitimate state to resemble in practice an ancient democracy,
is not required because man’s “natural goodness” fits him for political virtue. Rather, since
indeed nature constrains man’s moral goodness, it is required precisely as an institutional
restraint (not unlike the modern doctrines of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances”)
that contains human selfishness.

Natural Rights and the Moral Infallibility of the Sovereign

Viewing Rousseau’s political theory in terms of the constraints of nature also sheds light
on the status of natural rights in the legitimate state. To understand how, consider that the classic
Lockean trio of natural rights (i.e., to “life, liberty, property”) corresponds to the natural goods –
self-preservation, physical well-being, and freedom – nature constrains all men to pursue.
Therefore, the “total alienation” of all the individuals’ natural rights cannot be understood to
mean that, in entering the social contract, they cease to be concerned with the goods to which
these rights correspond. Indeed, Rousseau explicitly acknowledges this point in the Social
Contract, “Of the Limits of Sovereign Power.” There, he initially endorses absolutism:
Just as nature gives each man absolute power over his members, the social pact
gives the body politic absolute power over all of its members, and it is this same
power which, directed by the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of
sovereignty. (61)
Yet he goes on to argue that the rightful sovereign always rules disinterestedly because the social
orders on his own authority is not a law” (SC, 67). Though citizens do not enjoy freedom in the
sense of unbridled license, they do enjoy freedom from the personal wills of others.
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contract limits its scope to general laws that aim at the good of all. In explaining this property of
the sovereign – the “generality of application” – Rousseau insists that it, obligating citizens to
prefer only the good of all, nevertheless also permits them to mingle their concern for their
individual goods in their moral deliberations:
Why is the general will always upright, and why do all consistently will each
one’s happiness, if not because there is no one who does not appropriate the word
each to himself, and think of himself as he votes for all? Which proves that the
equality of right and the notion of justice which it produces follows from each
one’s preference for himself and hence from the nature of man. (SC, 61-62,
emphasis in original)
Thus in entering the social contract, individuals do not promise to cease wanting their natural
rights. Rather, they only promise to change the means by which they secure them, giving up the
right to do anything and everything for the sake of their preservation in favor of political liberty,
which, via the “double generality,” rectifies individual rights claims by checking them against
the legitimate good of others. As Rousseau insists toward the end of this chapter:
Instead of an alienation they have only made an advantageous exchange of an
uncertain and precarious way of being in favor of a more secure and better one, of
natural independence in favor of freedom, of the power to harm others in favor of
their own security, and of their force which others could overwhelm in favor of
right made invincible by the social union. (SC, 63)11
This perspective also enables the interpreter to justify Rousseau’s claim regarding the
sovereign’s moral infallibility: “The Sovereign,” as he says, “by the mere fact that it is, is
always everything it ought to be” (SC, 52). Far from being a tautology, this property of
legitimate sovereignty is a logical consequence of its universality and the constraints of nature,
as reflection shows. Recall, first, that by the social contract the sovereign “is formed entirely of
11

Masters says, “The surrender of man’s claim to natural right does not destroy that pre-political
right because purely conventional duties cannot annihilate man’s physical nature as an individual
being” (Political Philosophy, 349). For similar points see, Masters, Political Philosophy, 318323.
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the individuals who make it up” (SC, 52) and features a strict legal identity among them and,
second, that no one harms himself. The combination of these premises produces the conclusion
that the sovereign can never harm any individual. As Rousseau explains, in the abbreviated
version of the Social Contract from Book 5 of the Emile:
According to the social pact the sovereign is able to act only by common and
general wills and… therefore its acts ought similarly to have only general and
common objects. From this it follows that an individual could not be directly
injured by the sovereign without everyone’s being injured. (461)
That is, since the rightful sovereign’s will always takes the form of universal laws which only
recognize the individual in the abstract, it never inflicts harm upon any particular individual
unless it also inflicts harm upon all the individuals, “but,” as Rousseau goes on, “this cannot be,
since it would be to want to harm oneself” (E, 461), which under the constraints of nature is
impossible. Thus the principles of right, in virtue of the “generality of application,” prevent the
sovereign from harming individuals because nature prevents the individual from harming
himself. Indeed, since this property of the sovereign is based on the constraints of nature, it is so
solid and certain that of it Rousseau can say, “It is no more believable that the general will would
agree to have any member of the State, regardless of who he may be, injure or destroy one
another, than the fingers of a man in possession of his reason gouge out his eyes” (PE, 17).

Moral Freedom and Virtue

I alluded above to Rousseau’s notion of the transformative, “denaturing” effect of civil
society on human character. Most often, he regards this effect as the phenomenon whereby man
ceases to perceive himself solely as an isolated individual and comes to perceive himself rather
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as a part of a greater political whole. However, in the Social Contract, “Of the Civil State,”
Rousseau includes in it another element which seems to put him at odds with the thesis this paper
advances. There, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the natural, as compared to the
civil, state, he argues:
What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited
right to everything he can reach; what he gains is civil freedom and property in
everything he possesses… To the preceding one might add to the credit of the
civil state moral freedom, which alone makes man truly the master of himself; for
the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has
prescribed to oneself is freedom. (53-54)
Against my contention, this passage suggests that it is not the case that for Rousseau human
nature never acquires anything resembling genuine, or irreducible, sociability. On the contrary,
through his socialization by legitimate political institutions, man’s nature acquires a moral will
and virtue and hence the capacity to reject selfish natural inclinations and instead to conform his
actions to “the voice of duty” (SC, 53). Indeed, though by nature “man… had looked only to
himself,” as a citizen he “act[s] on other principles, and… consult[s] his reason before listening
to his inclinations” (SC, 53).
It can be argued, however, that the thesis that man’s socialization does not give him an
irreducible principle of sociability is compatible with Rousseau’s conceptions of duty and civic
“morals and virtue.” Though space does not permit me to fully integrate them in this essay’s
framework, I briefly mention two possible lines of argument: First, man’s socialization in
legitimate civil society does enable him to combat, and even to transcend, natural selfishness and
to prefer duty in his actions, but only to a limited degree, for the moral duties themselves,
because they are offshoots of the general will, bear the traces of the constraints of nature. Thus,
when the citizen abides by morality from virtue, he does not surmount the conditions the
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constraints attach to human benevolence. Second, he cannot do so because the very forces that
permit this phenomenon of self-combatting – virtue and moral freedom – actually do not
constitute principles in the soul separate from self-love and pity. Rather, they ultimately reduce
to self-love qua amour propre, that is, to self-love’s social and relative or comparative form.
In considering the first, note that if, as I argue above, citizens desire the common good
from self-interest inside the sovereign assembly due to institutional restraints, it is a wholly
different matter outside the assembly when they no longer apply. Then, the same selfishness,
which makes them will the common good as members of the sovereign, inclines them to shirk
moral duty as private subjects. While this implies the need for government to punish
lawbreakers (SC, 52-53), as Rousseau makes clear in the Political Economy, the well-ordered
state relies primarily not on coercive force to ensure law abidingness, but on education to civic
virtue:
Do you wish the general will carried out? See to it that all particular wills take
their bearings by it; and since virtue is nothing but this conformity of the
particular will to the general will, to say the same thing in a word, make virtue
reign. (13)
Whereas “man as he is” adheres to duty, so to speak, against his will due to the threat of force,
the true citizen does so voluntarily from virtue. Accordingly, Rousseau insists on the necessity
for, and practical possibility of, civic virtue. But does this weaken this essay’s contention
regarding the primacy of natural selfishness? To answer, note that the conceptions of moral duty
and virtue are parasitic on those of political right. For example, in the passage just cited,
Rousseau defines virtue narrowly as “conformity of the particular to the general will.”12

12

See also Geneva, 160, and PE, 15. For a discussion of “morals and virtue” in this vein, see
Melzer, Natural Goodness, 101-104, and Orwin, “Sources of Ethics,” 67-68.
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Moreover, toward the beginning of the Political Economy, he articulates the essential categories
by which one thinks of legitimate civil society, and then he says:
From these same distinctions applied to every political society and its members
flow the most universal and dependable rules by which to judge a good or a bad
government and, in general, the morality of all human actions. (7, emphasis
added)
This suggests that moral duty is mediated by legitimate law. In other words, the substance of
citizens’ duties gets its nature from the categories of political right. But since these are
formulated in such a way as to satisfy the constraints of nature, this implies that moral duty
satisfies them as well. Indeed, if by “moral duty” Rousseau simply means rejecting harmful
private interests and limiting oneself to the good of all – which is also nevertheless one’s own –
this certainly satisfies the constraint that places primary importance on our essential, non-zerosum individual goods. Thus, though the virtuous citizen overcomes natural selfishness to some
degree, he does not do so to the extent of overcoming the constraints of nature.13
For the second, it is crucial to point out that civic “morals and virtue” are politically
mediated in two additional ways: namely, by love of one’s own as patriotism and by moral
pride, or esteem, regulated by public opinion. Though these are not, of course, mercenary, selfinterested calculations, neither are they irreducible, natural sociability; rather, they arise in the
soul as politically educated forms of the sentiments self-love and amour propre. Consider for
13

This conclusion is reinforced when one notes that Rousseau attaches the same conditionality to
citizen duties that he attaches to other moralities. He says that “the commitments which bind us
to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual” (SC, 61; see also PE, 10, 17). He
argues, moreover, that citizens recover their natural freedom if the rulers infringe the principles
of legitimacy (SC, 50, 57). The primacy of natural selfishness, moreover, is made clear when
one considers the legitimacy of the death penalty or conscription, for if self-preservation is the
state’s entire purpose, how can it legitimately command one to sacrifice one’s life? See Melzer,
Natural Goodness, 197-198, for a discussion of this. This problem is at least one reason why
Rousseau introduces the civil religion (SC, 150).
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example Rousseau’s statements in the Political Economy, where he asks, “Do we want peoples
to be virtuous? Let us then begin by making them love their fatherland” (16). This is
accomplished by “public education” which “is... one of the fundamental maxims of popular or
legitimate government” (PE, 21).
If… [the citizens] are taught from sufficiently early on… to perceive their own
existence as… only a part of [the state’s] existence, they will at last succeed in
somehow identifying with this larger whole, to feel themselves members of the
fatherland, to love it with that exquisite sentiment which any isolated man has
only for himself, to raise their soul perpetually to this great object, and thus to
transform into a sublime virtue the dangerous disposition that gives rise to all of
our vices. (PE, 20, emphasis added)
This suggests that the capacities in citizens’ souls that enable them to abide by moral duty from
virtue ultimately reduce to sentiment; hence, they do not form a principle of sociability separate
from self-love. This is reinforced, moreover, by the political schemes Rousseau promotes
throughout the Government of Poland, which attempt to inspire moral virtue by linking it to
public opinion and reputation and hence in turn to the citizens’ gratification of their amour
propre (185, 188-189, 191, 239-243; see also SC, 141). This evidence suggests that, against the
notion that “moral freedom” signifies irreducible sociability in citizens’ souls, Rousseau believes
the following statement from the Emile:
One has a hold on the passions only by means of the passions. It is by their
empire that their tyranny must be combated; and it is always from nature itself
that the proper instruments to regulate nature must be drawn. (327)14
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For a discussion on how morality for Rousseau is mediated by self-love and amour propre, see
Orwin, “Sources of Ethics,” 75-77. See also Melzer, Natural Goodness, 191n, for the same
point.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

In his book The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought,
interpreter Arthur Melzer attributes to Rousseau’s thought a hybrid vision of man he calls
“idealistic realism.”1 This paper argues that the “realistic” half of this vision unfolds in a view
of man according to which our basic nature as asocial beings permanently constrains our moral
goodness. This implies that, though the faculty of perfectibility permits positive forms of
sociability (e.g., Emile and the citizen) they ultimately reduce to selfishness and contain various
bounds or limitations that I call “constraints of nature.” According to them, man always seeks
his good in the sense of prioritizing his narrow, individual interest over social morality in case of
conflict, always harms others for his own advantage if able (and therefore cannot rule in the
common interest), and does not obey particular persons. One fruit of this analysis is the above
discussion of the basic structure of political legitimacy as a consequence of the constraints. Here
I briefly discuss another.
Many interpreters have tried to demonstrate Rousseau’s consistency by attempting to
reconcile the ideas found in the “individualist” Second Discourse with those found in the
“collectivist” Social Contract. Assuming the validity of my analysis, it may be possible
to find links between the two works by viewing both of them in terms of the constraints of
nature. For example, according to the Second Discourse the original state of nature is

1

Natural Goodness, 23-26, 283-288.
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characterized by reciprocal liberty and non-oppression. If this corresponds to the constraint of
nature that renders man incapable of submitting to personal authority, it may indicate that
Rousseau seeks to artificially recreate this aspect of the original state of nature with his
egalitarian formulation of the general will. In addition, my treatment of the general will
shows that the “double generality” eliminates conflicted interests by redirecting individual wills
toward the legitimate goods, the security for which civil society is instituted. This also
artificially recreates the original state of nature in the sense that, in the latter, interests never
conflict because natural man only pursues his essential physical needs (albeit without any need
for political force).2
Of course, the concept of the general will does not exhaust Rousseau’s political thought.
Absent from this is a more extensive discussion of the conceptions of civic education,
patriotism, and citizens’ sentiments and the quasi-sociological analysis of varying peoples’
suitability for legitimate institutions. Absent as well is an analysis of the moral sentiments in
general and, relatedly, Rousseau’s conceptions of varying other non-mercenary moral
2

Scott pursues this line of thought in an interesting article, “The Theodicy of the Second
Discourse: The ‘Pure State of Nature’ and Rousseau’s Political Thought.” Rousseau as well
suggests a correspondence between the natural order and the civil order in the following passage
from Emile Book 2:
There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence
on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way
detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without
order, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. If there is
any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm the
general wills with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will. If the laws of
nations could, like those of nature, have an inflexibility that no human force could ever
conquer, dependence on men would then become dependence on things again; in the republic
all the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and
freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises him
to virtue. (85)
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alternatives to rational self-interest (e.g., pity, humanity, and the conscience).
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